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Abstract: Gender quotas are frequently proposed to address persistent gender imbalances in 
managerial roles. However, it is unclear how quotas for female managers affect organizations and 
whether quotas improve or damage relationships between managers and their subordinates. We 
conduct a representative survey to study opinions on quotas for female managers and based upon 
the survey design a novel set of experiments to investigate how quotas influence wage setting and 
effort provision. Our findings reveal that both opinions about gender quotas and workplace 
behavior crucially depend on the workplace environment. In our survey, we observe that approval 
for gender quotas is low if women are not disadvantaged in the manager selection process, 
regardless of whether there are gender differences in performance. Complementing this evidence, 
we observe in our experiments that quotas lead to lower effort levels and lower wages in such 
environments. By contrast, in environments in which women are disadvantaged in the selection 
process, we observe a higher approval of quotas as well as higher effort levels and higher wages. 
These findings are consistent with the concept of meritocracy and suggest that it is important to 
evaluate the perception of gender disadvantages in the workplace environment before 
implementing quotas. 
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Proponents of gender quotas regard them as a last resort and a necessary evil to address gender 
gaps that have not closed organically.1 However, during recent decades, resistance to gender 
quotas has weakened considerably and they are now implemented in many different 
environments. The number of countries to adopt gender quotas has risen from 5 to more than 120 
in less than 50 years (Quota Project, 2016). In the private sector, gender quotas at the upper 
echelon have affected thousands of organizations and are likely to be implemented even more 
widely.2 Such quotas not only affect the gender composition of superiors, but also could affect 
the relationship between superiors and their subordinates, and ultimately, organizational 
performance. For example, if subordinates believe that their female superior is in a position 
because of a quota rather than merit, they might be less motivated and less cooperative. By 
contrast, if subordinates believe that a quota helps to overcome gender disadvantages, then they 
might be more motivated and cooperative compared to when there is no quota. 
 Our study provides new insights by experimentally investigating the impact of gender 
quotas on the functioning of workplaces relations. A key consideration in our design is the link 
between gender quotas and meritocracy. Our main hypothesis is that the impact of gender quotas 
on the functioning of hierarchical relationships depends on how they affect the expected 
suitability of the selected superior: quotas improve their functioning if they increase suitability 
but harm their functioning if they decrease suitability.3 To test this hypothesis, and rule out 
alternative explanations, we design and conduct a representative survey as well as a set of 
laboratory experiments. Both survey and experiments capture reactions to quotas for female 
                                                        
1 For example, Australian Institute of Company Directors chair Elizabeth Proust concedes that quotas might be the 
last resort in the battle to get even with the “blokes’ club” in corporate Australia (http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-
09-26/companies-warned-they-could-face-gender-quotas/8987862).     
Furthermore, according to a panel of female technology and business leaders, “Female quotas are a necessary evil to 
guarantee enough women rise to the top echelon of business and public life in Australia” 
(http://www.smh.com.au/it-pro/expertise/quotas-still-needed-to-guarantee-women-rise-in-business-leaders-
20140313-hvidi.html). 
2 Norway became the first country to introduce a quota for female directors of listed companies in 2008. Since then, 
both mandatory and voluntary gender quotas for corporate boards have been imposed in Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Spain, while the European Commission, 
Australia, Britain, and Sweden are considering quotas for female directors (The Economist, 2014; European 
Commission, 2016). 
3 Suitability refers to the ability of a candidate to perform in the role of a superior. 
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managers in environments in which gender differences in performance and disadvantage in the 
selection procedure vary.  
The survey provides first suggestive evidence in favor of our main hypothesis and 
emphasizes the importance of the workplace environment. We observe that general opinions 
toward gender quotas for female managerial positions are divided and depend on the 
respondents’ own workplace environment. Importantly, as hypothesized, we find that opinions 
shift when we present different workplace environments under which quotas are implemented. 
Quotas clearly lack majority support in environments in which the quotas do not increase the 
suitability of female managers, because women are not disadvantaged in the manager selection 
process. Alternatively, if the quotas increase this suitability because women are disadvantaged, 
female quotas are supported by a large majority. 
Next, we test whether these opinions translate into behavior in a laboratory labor market. 
We use a set of economic experiments to study the causal impact of gender quotas on 
hierarchical workplace behavior in systematically different workplace environments. 
Complementing the survey evidence with laboratory experiments has four key advantages: only 
in the laboratory, we can (i) exogenously manipulate the managerial selection and randomly 
implement gender quotas, (ii) exogenously manipulate the workplace environment, (iii) have 
complete transparency about the emergence of hierarchical relations, and (iv) provide monetary 
incentives to counter potential social desirability bias. Taken together, our survey and experiment 
provide a wider glimpse into the relationship between gender quotas and organizational 
performance than most other studies. 
Our experiments consist of two connected parts. First, subjects participate in a 
performance task. Second, subjects are assigned to the role of manager or worker in a gift-
exchange game, depending on their earlier task performance and treatment. We follow a 3-by-2 
design. In the no-quota treatments, the best performers are promoted to the role of manager. By 
contrast, in the quota treatments, the procedure guarantees a proportion of managerial positions 
to the best-performing women. We test the impact of quota relative to no quota on behavior 
between managers and workers in three different stylized workplace environments akin to our 
survey, which are characterized by (i) the absence of gender differences in performance, (ii) the 
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presence of gender differences in performance, or (iii) the presence of disadvantage against 
women in the selection procedure.   
Our findings reveal reactions to gender quotas. The experimental findings are consistent 
with the survey evidence and corroborate our main hypothesis. We find that gender quotas affect 
hierarchical relationships and that the impact crucially depends on the environment in which the 
quota is implemented. If the gender quota is implemented in an environment in which women’s 
performance is believed to be on average lower than men’s performance, it causes a decline in 
gift exchange, with lower wages and effort levels than when there is no quota. If the gender 
quota is implemented in the absence of any gender performance differences, it causes lower 
wages and effort levels than when there is no quota. However, if the quota is implemented in an 
environment in which there is discrimination against women, it leads to higher wage and effort 
levels than when there is no quota.  
This study bridges and extends the scope of two growing research fields. It connects 
research on gender quotas (e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013; Niederle et al., 
2013, Balafoutas et al., 2016; Peters and Schröder, 2017; Mollerstrom, 2018) to research on 
fairness in hierarchical relationships (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Charness and Haruvy, 2002; 
Charness and Kuhn, 2007; Charness and Kuhn, 2011; Brown et al., 2012; Herz et al., 2018).  
The related literature on gender quotas is focused on experimental studies investigating 
whether quotas assist women to compete in workplace settings (e.g., Schotter and Weigelt, 1992; 
Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Niederle et al., 2013; Bracha et al., 2015; Leibbrandt et al., 2017) 
and field studies investigating mandated quotas for corporate boards in Norway (e.g., Ahern and 
Dittmar, 2013; Matsa and Miller, 2013; Bertrand et al., 2014) and village councils in India (e.g., 
Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Beaman et al., 2009).4 By contrast, our study provides insights 
                                                        
4 The findings in these studies suggest that gender quotas are complex and their impact crucially depends on context 
and measurement. For example, while most experimental studies find that gender quotas encourage females to 
compete in tournaments, Leibbrandt et al. (2017) suggest that this encouragement effect is absent in an environment 
in which sabotage is possible. Furthermore, while Ahern and Dittmar (2013) find that the Norwegian quota led to 
less experienced boards and a decline in operating performance, Matsa and Miller (2013) find that the quota did not 
affect corporate decisions, except for employment policies. Firms affected by the female board quota undertook 
fewer workforce reductions, leading to lower short-term profits. Dahl et al. (2018) find that gender stereotypes in the 




on how quotas are perceived in different workplace environments, how quotas impact workplace 
relationships, and consequently, how they affect organizational performance. Thus, our study 
complements research on quotas and their functioning in discriminatory environments (Peters 
and Schröder, 2017), in environments in which they are implemented based on an arbitrary 
characteristic (Balafoutas et al., 2016), and in environments where coordination determines 
efficiency (Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012). In addition, our study advances the literature by 
investigating environments that capture key workplace features, allowing for a rigorous test of 
different behavioral models, and corroborates the importance of meritocracy in the context of 
gender quotas.  
There is manifold evidence for the key role of fairness in hierarchical relationships 
(Kahneman et al., 1986; Konow, 1996, 2000; Charness and Haruvy, 2002; Fehr et al., 2008; 
Kube et al., 2012). In particular, there is experimental evidence that fairness is a crucial 
ingredient for efficiency wages and firm profit (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Fehr et 
al., 1993; Charness and Kuhn, 2007; Charness et al., 2012; Gächter et al., 2013; Englmaier and 
Strasser, 2014; Gilchrist et al., 2016; see also Fehr et al., 2009 for a survey). In the context of 
organizations and hierarchical relationships, fairness is often associated with meritocracy. 
Meritocracy refers to an environment in which advancement is based on performance and 
qualifications, and not demographic variables, background, or connections. Meritocracy implies 
that a typical workplace setting is regarded as fair when more productive workers are paid more 
than less productive workers and are more likely to be promoted. In turn, income inequalities due 
to differences in individual achievement are considered fair and as reward for hard work, while 
inequalities owing to luck are considered unfair (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Benabou and 
Tirole, 2006). In contrast to existing research, which corroborates the view that unequal 
outcomes do not harm cooperativeness if they are the result of meritocracy (Almås et al., 2010; 
Cappelen et al., 2013; Almås et al., 2016), we study the extent to which unequal treatment by 
quotas affects cooperativeness and depends on the meritocratic nature of the quota. 
From a methodological standpoint, our study takes a new direction by combining both 
survey and economic experiment methods to increase the possible insights from either method in 
                                                        
Finally, while Beaman et al. (2009) find that quotas in India weaken gender stereotypes, the authors also find an 
increase in distaste for female leaders.   
6 
 
isolation. The survey on its own provides insights on opinions from a representative sample and 
exploits the variation in the participants’ work backgrounds to uncover how quotas are perceived 
in different workplace environments. The experiment on its own provides insights on behavioral 
reactions in simulated and exogenously manipulated workplace environments. Together, and by 
building on each other, our survey and experiment improve the generalizability of our quota 
findings. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The representative survey design and results 
are explained in Section 2. Section 3 outlines the complementary laboratory experimental design 
and procedures. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 sums up our conclusions. The Appendix 
contains the instructions used in the experiment. 
 
2. Representative Survey Evidence 
Several large surveys measure general opinions toward affirmative action (AA). In 
particular, Gallup conducts an annual social science poll, which includes questions to elicit 
opinions about AA. On the topic of gender, one of their recent polls shows that 67% of 
Americans support AA for women (Gallup, 2015). By contrast, there are relatively few surveys 
about gender quotas. In a 2014 global survey of 12,500 senior executives, 45% of respondents 
expressed support for gender quotas (Grant Thornton, 2014). A large European survey found that 
more than 40% of Europeans believe that a 50% gender quota for females on listed companies is 
a realistic target (European Commission, 2012). Meanwhile, 22% of men and 49% of women 
support quotas for women in parliament in a recent Australian survey (Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, 2016). 
Our large survey complements the existing evidence in at least three ways. First, our 
survey was designed to capture opinions about gender quotas for leadership positions more 
generally (instead of only for parliament or corporate boards). Thus, we investigate opinions on 
gender quotas in a much broader space. Second, we analyze opinions based on the respondents’ 
own workplaces. Thus, we start looking beyond the surface and take into consideration that 
opinions systematically differ across workplaces. Finally, we present respondents with 
systematically different workplace environments to further investigate the drivers behind 
opinions about gender quotas. 
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2.1. Survey Methodology 
We commissioned a national survey of 1,011 US residents eliciting opinions toward 
gender quotas for leadership positions.5 The sample was representative of the US population 
according to the US census regarding gender, age, ethnicity, and region. To ensure the validity of 
the results, (i) subjects were initially screened to ensure they resided in the US and were above 
the age of 18 years, (ii) three attention checks at different points in the survey were undertaken to 
discourage respondents from randomly selecting responses,6 (iii) respondents could not quickly 
click through the survey without reading questions, as they could move to the next question only 
after 12 seconds, and (iv) subjects were not able to return to a survey page and change answers. 
The survey started by eliciting respondents’ general opinions toward gender quotas for female 
representation in managerial leadership positions, by using a 5-point Likert scale asking to the 
extent to which they approved whether “Gender quotas should be used to increase the number of 
women in leadership positions.”7 
To study the role of the workplace environment and the presence/absence of gender skill 
gaps as well as disadvantages against women in the leadership selection procedure, we asked our 
respondents to what extent gender quotas should be used to increase the number of women in 
leadership positions in the following three workplace environments.8 
• Workplace environment with skill gap: “Suppose that female candidates are on average less 
qualified for a certain leadership position than male candidates and there is no bias against 
female candidates in the selection process relative to male candidates.” 
• Workplace environment with no difference: “Suppose that female candidates are on 
average equally qualified for a certain leadership position relative to male candidates and 
there is no bias against female candidates in the selection process relative to male 
candidates.” 
                                                        
5 The survey was undertaken by Qualtrics using its survey platform. 
6 For instance, directly after eliciting opinions about quotas, respondents were told “Thank you for answering the 
prior questions. You will now be asked a number of attitude and demographic questions. To proceed, please select 
‘strongly disagree’.” Subjects that failed to answer with strongly disagree where ejected from the survey without 
payment.   
7 Possible responses are “strongly agree,” “agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree,” and “strongly disagree.” 





• Workplace environment with disadvantage: “Suppose that female candidates are on average 
equally qualified for a certain leadership position relative to male candidates but there is 
bias against female candidates in the selection process relative to male candidates.”  
The ordering of these three specific labor market environment questions was random.9 
Finally, the survey included standard demographic questions such as income, age, gender as well 
as the participants’ perceptions of skill gap and disadvantage in their own profession. Precisely, 
we asked respondents the extent to which they agreed with the following two statements.  
• “In your profession, female candidates are on average less capable of taking leadership 
roles than male candidates.”  
•  “In your profession, there is bias against female candidates in the selection process of 
leadership positions relative to male candidates.”10 
The questions correspond to our work place environments. The first question is aimed at 
understanding whether respondents believe that a skill gap exists between male and females 
within their professions, while the second question is aimed at eliciting opinions about 
disadvantage within their professions.  
2.2. Survey Findings 
Figure 1 provides an overview of general opinions about quotas for female managerial 
positions. The figure shows that opinions are strongly divided if the workplace environment is 
not specified. We observe that a similar percentage of respondents express either positive (44%) 
or negative opinions (37%) toward a female quota for leadership positions. 
Figure 1: General opinions about gender quotas in the United States 
                                                        
9 Analysis suggests that there are no significant order effects. A detailed analysis is available from the authors upon 
request. 




Notes: The figure represents average general opinions toward gender 
quotas. Confidence intervals on each bar illustrate significance at the 
10% level. Data are from 1,011 representative US residents.  
 
Figures 2a–c reveal that there is significantly more consensus about quotas once we specify 
the workplace environment. Figure 2a shows that 51% of respondents oppose gender quotas 
when there is no discrimination against women and when there are no gender differences in 
performance (No Diff.). The opposition to gender quotas is even more pronounced in an 
environment in which there is no discrimination against women and they underperform relative 
to men (Figure 2b). In this case, around 60% of respondents oppose gender quotas (Skill Gap). 
However, in Figure 2c, we clearly observe majority support for gender quotas in an environment 
in which women are disadvantaged in the leadership selection process. More than 70% of the 
respondents agree that gender quotas should be used and only 13% disapprove. Table 1 (panel A) 
shows that the differences in opinions across workplace environments are highly significant.11 
{INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE} 
Figures 2a-–c: Opinions toward quotas in the United States 
                                                        
11 Specifically, we take the mean of responses that range from 1= strongly agree to 5= strongly disagree. We find 
that the mean response to the base question is 2.87, which is in-between the two extreme categories. By contrast, the 
survey responses to opinions about the skill gap and no difference are 3.58 and 3.31 respectively, indicating a strong 
dislike for quotas within these environments. The mean response for the disadvantage question is 2.08. At the mean, 
all questions are statistically different from each other at p<.01. Results are consistent when split by gender, the key 
exception being that females are more likely to agree with quotas except when skill differences exist.  
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Notes: Figure (a) left: average opinions toward quotas for women in an environment in which there are no gender 
differences in skill and no disadvantage against women; Figure (b) center: opinions toward quotas for women in an 
environment in which women on average have lower skill than men and there is no disadvantage against women; 
Figure (c) right: opinions toward gender quotas in an environment in which there is disadvantage against women and 
there are no gender differences in skill. Each bar contains confidence intervals, which illustrate significance at the 
10% level. Data are from 1,011 representative US residents.  
 
Our representative survey provides first suggestive evidence that respondents’ own 
profession is related to the expectation of gender performance difference and gender 
discrimination.12 Specifically, when we examine responses to the general question by occupation 
group, we observe that 57.7% of respondents in office and admin occupations express positive 
opinions about quotas, 50% do so in math and computers, but only 45.1% do so in health, 37.5% 
in teaching occupations, and 35.1% in construction.13 
Importantly, we observe that the respondents perceive their own profession differently in 
terms of gender skill gaps and gender disadvantages. Figure 3 illustrates the perceptions of 
employees in several key occupations.14 The vertical axis plots median responses to the 
occupation-based skill-gap question and the horizontal axis plots median responses to the 
occupation-based disadvantage question. Employees in social service, health, and teaching 
occupations are much more likely to believe that female candidates within their profession are 
similarly capable to male candidates compared to those in engineering, military, and protection 
occupations. Meanwhile, employees in transportation and construction occupations are more 
likely to believe that female leaders suffer from bias in the leadership selection process. The key 
                                                        
12 To elicit occupation, we use a variant of the US census aggregate classification of occupation.  
13 We report mean responses for all environments by key occupations in Table A2. A Kruskal-Wallis test of overall 
significance suggests that attitudes towards quotas differs across occupations in all environments. However, it does 
not appear there is a significant pattern between the type of occupations and perceptions of skill gap and 
disadvantage. 
14 Responses from all occupation groups are in Appendix Table A1. 
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take-away message from this graph is that occupations are perceived to differ significantly on the 
performance and disadvantage dimensions. Many occupations show consistent characteristics 
and fall within the three distinct environments. Service occupations, such as teaching, social 
services, health, and office admin, are characterized by low relative skill gap and disadvantage, 
and thus, these occupations are consistent with our no-difference environment. Military, 
protection, and engineering occupations are characterized by employees’ belief that a skill gap 
exists, and as such, these occupations are more consistent with the skill-gap environment. By 
contrast, respondents in construction and transportation occupations are more likely to believe 
that a large relative disadvantage exists, which is consistent with our disadvantage environment.  
 
Figure 3: Perceptions of skill gap and disadvantage within occupations 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates perceptions of labor market conditions in respondents’ own profession. For simplicity, a 
subset of occupations is shown; for a full list of occupations see Appendix 1, Table A1. Markers with more than one 
occupation, such as social services, health, and teaching, have (independently) the same median skill gap and 
disadvantage. We do not collapse occupation groups into separate categories. Responses range from 1 at the origin to 
5. Data are from 1,011 representative US residents who indicate they participate in the labor force. 
 
These survey findings provide suggestive evidence that gender quotas might affect 
organizational performance, assuming that opinions translate into behavior in the workplace. To 






underlying channels, we design and conduct a set of laboratory experiments. A key difference 
between our survey and the experiment is the sample population. Our participants in the 
experiment are not nationally representative; they are all university students from an Australian 
university (Monash), young (89% are between 18 and 24 years), and have little workplace 
experience (70% are not in paid employment). 
 To identify the role of sampling on opinions on gender quotas, we conduct the same US 
representative survey with a sample of 171 students from the Monash laboratory subject pool. 
Like the US survey, the Monash survey was conducted online, using the Qualtrics platform. 
Each subject received $10 for successfully completing the survey. Average opinions are reported 
in Table 1 (panel B). In general, we find very little difference in perceptions about quotas across 
our two samples, suggesting that the laboratory sample holds comparable attitudes towards 
gender quotas relative to the representative US sample. 
3. Experimental Design in the Laboratory 
In this section, we present our experimental design. We randomized the implementation 
of gender quotas and manipulated the perception of gender performance differences and 
discrimination against women not only to test the extent to which quotas affect hierarchical 
relationships but also to test different economic models. 
There are two main parts in our experiments. The first consists of an arithmetic task and 
the second a gift-exchange game. The two parts are connected in two important ways. First, the 
performance in the first part co-determines who is promoted to the role of manager in the second 
part. Second, the task performances of the managers reflect managerial ability in the sense that 
they affect the payoffs of managers and their workers in the second part.  
We used a 3-by-2 experimental design. Specifically, there are three experiments, each 
consisting of two treatments. The experiments and treatments were determined at the start of the 
second part. Subjects knew that there were two parts but they did not know the details of the 
second part until they finished the first part. The experiments varied the information that was 
given to the subjects and the treatments varied in the manager selection procedure. After each 




The experimental sessions were conducted at the Monash University Laboratory for 
Experimental Economics and lasted for approximately 70 minutes. Sessions were conducted 
between April and May of 2016. Subjects earned an average A$33.40. The experiment was 
computerized using Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited using ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2015). Subjects were required to answer a set of control questions correctly before the 
start of the experiment.  
3.1. Part 1: The Arithmetic Task 
In the first part, each subject was given 5 minutes to complete as many sums of five 
randomly chosen two-digit numbers as possible. We informed subjects that the performance in 
this task would increase their chance of higher earnings in the second part but did not specify 
further details. While this procedure does not parallel typical workplace environments where 
participants usually know for what they are competing for it was necessary to avoid subjects 
believing that task 1 was part of a competition so that performance in task 1 was not influenced 
by gender differences under competitive pressure (Gneezy et al., 2013). Moreover, we did not 
inform subjects about their actual performance in this task (i.e., how many sums they correctly 
answered).  
We chose the arithmetic task for three main reasons. It provides a simple and objective 
performance measure, it has been used in related experiments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), 
and there is variance in the extent of gender differences in performance in this task in the 
literature, which we made use of in our different treatments.15 
In order to reduce gender saliency in the arithmetic task, subjects were never asked about 
their gender. Rather, before entering the laboratory, each subject was given a paper slip with a 
random number on it. Random odd (even) numbers were given to female (male) subjects. 
Subjects then entered their random numbers into the computer such that the computer could 
assign gender without knowing the subject’s identity.  
3.2. Part 2: The Gift-exchange Game 
                                                        
15 Some studies report no statistically significant gender differences (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), while others 
identify significant differences (Cameron et al., 2015). 
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After the subjects finished the arithmetic task, we followed a stratified randomly 
sampling technique and assigned subjects into groups consisting of two males and two females. 
There are two managers and two workers in each group, which were labelled as such in the 
instructions (“manager”, “worker”).  We paired each manager with one worker of the opposite 
sex, and thus, there are two manager–worker (hierarchical) pairs in each group. Subjects were 
informed of their partners’ gender with a generic male or female icon (see the instructions for 
further details). We employed a partner design, implying that each manager always interacted 
with the same worker throughout the second part.  
 The second part of the experiment consists of a gift-exchange game, which lasted for 15 
periods (Fehr et al., 1993; Charness and Kuhn, 2011). In each period, managers first chose a 
wage level and then workers responded with an effort level. Specifically, at the beginning of 
each period, each manager received an endowment of 240 points and then chose a wage between 
20 and 120 points for the worker s/he was paired with. Thereafter, each worker was informed 
about the wage and decided how much effort to provide for her/his manager. Higher effort 
results in higher payoff for the manager but is at the same time costly for the worker. Table 2 
shows the costs in points for each effort level.  
{INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE} 
After the worker chose her/his effort level, the manager was informed of it before the next 
period began. The base payoffs are:  
▪ Manager’s payoff per period = (240 – wage) × effort  
▪ Worker's payoff per period = (wage – effort cost – 20). 
The base payoffs are identical to the seminal gift exchange game of Fehr et al., (1993). A 
novel feature of our gift-exchange game is that final payoffs not only depend on the endowment, 
wage, and effort, but also on the arithmetic task performance. In particular, the payoffs of the 
manager and worker from the gift-exchange game were multiplied by the manager’s arithmetic 
task (number of correct sums) at the end of the experiment to obtain the final payoff. This feature 
captures the reality that candidates are usually chosen as managers based on their performance in 
tasks that predict their performance as managers, and, in turn, the organization’s performance 
and the managers’ and workers'’ wages. Making both a manager’s and a worker’s payoffs a 
function of the manager’s performance in the first part accounts for these relationships in the 
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simplest possible manner. In addition, it makes the management selection procedure transparent 
and objective for the subjects since promotion is dependent on only one performance measure—
the score in the arithmetic task. At the end of the experiment, the points that subjects earned 
during the second task were converted into Australian dollars at an exchange rate of 100 points = 
A$1. We randomly selected 3 out of the 15 periods for payment. 
We chose the framework of the gift-exchange experiment because it provides the most 
basic set-up of a hierarchical workplace relationship and has been widely studied (Fehr et al., 
1993; Charness and Haruvy., 2002 Charness and Kuhn, 2007, 2011), facilitating the 
classification of our findings. The game also represents an analogy of hierarchical relationships 
in the field beyond wage-setting and effort provision. The wage chosen by the manager could be 
interpreted as how much time, effort, and attention a manager is willing to give to a worker and 
how much effort the worker puts in could be regarded as how cooperative and compliant workers 
are with their managers.  
3.3 Implementation of Gender Quotas: Two Manager Selection Procedures 
Subjects in each of our three experiments were randomly assigned into one of two 
manager selection procedures: no quota and quota. Under the no-quota procedure, the two 
subjects (in the group of four) with the highest task score (the number of sums answered 
correctly) were selected as managers. If two or more subjects had the same score, the computer 
randomly selected one of them to be the manager. Under the quota procedure, one of the 
manager roles was reserved for the highest-scoring female. The subject with the highest score 
out of the remaining three in the group became the other manager, regardless of gender.  
While the implemented gender quota guarantees female representation at the manager 
level, its impact is relatively minor in our experiments. The quota only re-allocates 9.6% of the 
manager positions in our experiments. To capture typical promotions in the field, note that we 
never revealed to the subjects whether a woman had become a manager because of the quota, nor 
did we inform the promoted women whether they were promoted because of the quota. Workers 
and managers knew only that there was a positive probability that a female manager was 
promoted because of the quota. 
3.4 Different Backgrounds for Gender Quotas: Three Experiments  
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We randomized subjects into three experiments (skill gap, no difference, and 
disadvantage) to capture the three environments that allow us to assess how gender performance 
and gender disadvantage affect the impact of quotas on hierarchical relationships. While the 
treatments and basic structure of parts 1 and 2 are the same, the experiments vary in the 
information given to the subjects on gender differences in task performance and whether there is 
bias against women’s task performance in the selection process. The three experiments enabled 
us to disentangle reactions to a gender quota: if (1 – “skill gap”), there is an average gender 
difference in the task that determines the selection of manager positions; if (2 – “no difference”), 
there are no gender differences of any kind; and if (3 – “disadvantage”), there is a disadvantage 
against women in the task during the selection process. In all three experiments, we told our 
subjects that we would count the number of questions correctly answered in the arithmetic task. 
The key difference between the three experiments is the additional information we provided 
before the start of task 2. The second quadrant in Appendix Figure A1 summarizes our 3-by-2 
experimental design.16 
In the skill-gap experiment, we informed the subjects that we observed gender 
differences in arithmetic task performance in a previous experimental session and that women 
solved on average 20% fewer arithmetic problems than did men. By contrast, in the no-difference 
experiment, we informed the subjects that in a previous experimental session we observed no 
significant gender differences in arithmetic task performance and that women and men solved 
approximately the same number of arithmetic problems. Because we held the selection procedure 
constant and used the same performance task, we could cleanly identify the role of information 
on average gender differences in performance. The information provided on task performance is 
based on actual pilot experiments.17  
 In the disadvantage experiment, women were disadvantaged and this was common 
knowledge among the subjects. Specifically, we informed subjects that, for the purpose of 
                                                        
16 It is entirely plausible that society or professions are located in another quadrant, but for the purpose of this study, 
we focused specifically on the second quadrant, as this is the most relevant for female quotas.   
17 We conducted four pilot experimental sessions before our three experiments, which included the arithmetic task. 
There were 24 subjects in each session. In two of the four sessions, we observed that women performed on average 
20% less (females scored 9.6 and 9.9 compared to males, who scored 12.2 and 12.6, respectively). By contrast, in the 
other two sessions, we did not observe significant gender differences in task performance (females scored 12.83 and 
10.3 on average compared to males, who scored 12.6 and 11.2, respectively).  
17 
 
manager selection, performance in only the first 4 of the 5 minutes in the arithmetic task were 
counted for women but all 5 minutes were counted for men. In other words, the score for women 
was based on the number of sums answered correctly in 4 minutes whereas the score for men 
was based on the number of sums answered correctly in 5 minutes. We chose the level of 
disadvantage in this treatment (1 out of 5 minutes) such that it corresponds to the performance 
gap (average of 20%) in the performance treatment. In addition, we informed subjects that we 
did not find gender differences in the arithmetic task performance in a previous experimental 
session. For the purpose of payoff, all 5 minutes of the task were counted regardless of gender, 
and this fact was known to the subjects. Therefore, this environment represents a scenario in 
which women are not worse managers but are discriminated against in the selection process. 
The goal of the three experiments is to investigate reactions to gender quotas when there 
is no uncertainty about the background of their implementation. Outside the laboratory 
environment, there are typically multiple reasons to implement gender quotas. In particular, the 
reason could be that gender quotas are the result of observed gender differences in ability and 
these gender differences may or may not be caused by disadvantage.18 Importantly, the 
perception of the labor market environment and whether there are perceived gender differences 
in performance and treatment may differ amongst individuals and be linked to gender and 
position in an organization.  
In our experiments, we not only made the labor market environment transparent and 
thereby aligned perceptions, we also made the determinants of the selection criteria transparent. 
We simplified the selection procedure as much as possible by making promotion dependent on 
only one performance measure—the score in the arithmetic task. This simplification has the 
advantage that the best applicants are always those with the highest task scores and whether 
quotas decrease or increase the quality of the successful applicant becomes objective.  
 
3.5 Belief Elicitation and Survey 
After the final period of part 2, we asked subjects to guess the average female and male 
arithmetic task scores in their session, as well as their own scores. We incentivized subjects to 
                                                        
18 According to a 2014 US Pew survey 33% of men and 52% of women believe that there are less women in top 
business positions because women are held to a higher standard than men (Pew, 2015). 
18 
 
guess accurately by rewarding them with A$1 for each response that did not deviate more than 1 
point from the actual score. The belief elicitation allowed us to check whether the treatments 
actually influenced subjects’ beliefs about the arithmetic task performance of males and females. 
After the experiment, subjects completed a short survey. 
3.6. Theoretical Background: Fairness, Marginal Productivity of Labor, and Gender Quotas  
Predictions of the standard neoclassical model are independent of experiment and 
treatment. In the first part, subjects attempt to solve as many sums as possible. In the second part, 
workers choose the lowest possible effort level (0.1) and managers choose the lowest possible 
wage (20). However, considerable evidence from gift-exchange experiments shows that 
managers offer more than the minimum wage and workers reciprocate by offering more than the 
minimum effort level (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993; Charness and Haruvy., 2002 Charness and Kuhn, 
2011, Charness et al., 2012). Importantly, standard reciprocity predictions do not predict 
differences across our various environments or treatments. 
The experiments capture three stylized environments in which the different manager 
selection procedures can be linked to fairness considerations. We focused on meritocracy as our 
main fairness consideration.19 In our framework, the meritocratic nature of the selection 
procedure is equivalent to the probability that the best two candidates are promoted as managers 
in each group of four. The selection process is expected to be more meritocratic if a higher-
performing candidate is selected as manager. This selection process can have a direct impact on 
the wage-setting of managers. It is possible that a selection process that is regarded as unfair may 
negatively affect the mood of participants, which may translate into less pro-social behavior. For 
instance, in the case of quotas being unmeritocratic, male managers, despite not directly 
suffering from the use of quotas, may be more hostile towards females because they feel that the 
system unfairly favors females. This may translate into lower wages and less effort in subsequent 
principal-agent interactions.20   
Table 3 summarizes the predictions for the gift-exchange levels. Gift-exchange level 
refers to the combination of wage and effort levels. Gift-exchange level increases when both 
                                                        
19 As discussed in Starmans et al. (2017), a meritocratic system is a key component of a fair society.  
20 Evidence for the impact of mood on behavior in the context of the gift-exchange game has been identified by 




wage and effort levels (weakly) increase.  In the skill-gap experiment, the quota was 
implemented to increase female representation at the managerial level in an environment in 
which women perform on average worse than men. According to our definition of meritocracy, 
the quota treatment is unfair, because it allows the possibility that women with lower task scores 
are promoted instead of men with higher task scores, whereas the no-quota treatment always 
selects the best candidates in this setting. Similarly, in the no-difference experiment, the quota 
was implemented in an environment in which there are no gender differences in performance. In 
this experiment, it remains possible that women with lower task scores were promoted instead of 
men with higher task scores. The quota treatment reduces the meritocratic nature of the selection 
procedure compared to the no-quota treatment, which always promotes the best candidates. 
{INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE} 
In the disadvantage experiment, the quota treatment can improve the meritocratic nature 
of the selection procedure relative to the no quota treatment because women are discriminated 
against and there are no average gender differences in performance. In the presence of such 
discrimination, the no-quota procedure might naively promote men with lower actual task score 
(but higher observed score) instead of women with higher actual task score (but lower observed 
score), whereas this is much less likely under the quota treatment, which helps correct the 
discrimination.21 In summary, if meritocracy is of concern to our subjects, then we should 
observe that implementing quotas lead to lower gift-exchange levels in the skill-gap and no-
difference environments, and higher gift-exchange levels in the disadvantage environment.  
Another important dimension of gender quotas is how they relate to the marginal 
productivity of labor. If gender quotas affect the likelihood with which the best applicants are 
promoted to managerial positions, they not only affect meritocracy but also can affect the 
marginal productivity of worker effort when workers’ payoff is linked to their managers’ 
performance. For example, if workers anticipate that gender quotas decrease the quality of the 
managers selected, then workers know that their marginal unit of effort translates into less 
expected surplus. Since quotas make it easier for females to become managers and more difficult 
for males to become managers in all environments, a male manager under the quota treatment is 
                                                        
21 Specifically, the quota helps to undo the disadvantage for females who would not become managers if only 4 
minutes of their score were counted but would become managers if all 5 minutes were counted.  
20 
 
expected to be a better performer than the average male manager under the no-quota treatment. 
Similarly, a female manager under the no-quota treatment is expected to be a better performer 
than the average female manager under the quota treatment. Thus, if workers work harder when 
the expected marginal productivity of labor is higher, then we should observe that workers with 
male managers provide more effort in the quota treatment than in the no-quota treatment, 
regardless of the environment. As a result of lower expected marginal productivity of labor, we 
should observe that workers with female managers should provide less effort in the quota 
treatment, regardless of the environment. 
4. Experimental Findings 
4.1. Overview 
In total, 516 subjects (258 females and 258 males) took part in our three experiments 
(N=172 in skill gap, 152 in no difference, and 192 in disadvantage). Overall in Task 1, males 
solved on average slightly more sums than did females (11.39 vs. 10.60, respectively, p=0.021), 
a difference that falls well within the range of previous literature, which often finds minor gender 
differences in performance. In Task 2, in accordance with previous evidence, wages and effort 
levels are higher than predicted by standard economic theory. Overall, managers on average 
offer a wage of 84.4 (minimal possible wage = 20, maximal possible wage = 120) and workers’ 
average effort level is 0.56 (minimal possible effort level = 0.1, maximal possible effort level = 
1). The minimal (maximal) possible wage was selected as 3.7% (10.5%) at the time. The 
minimal (maximal) effort level was chosen as 14.6% (10.9%) at the time. Both wages and effort 
levels remain stable across periods, except for the last period. In period 15, both wages and effort 
levels significantly decline, which is consistent with the endgame effect.  
4.2. Skill Gap: The Impact of Quotas with Gender Performance Difference  
In the skill-gap experiment, subjects were informed that females solved on average 20% 
fewer arithmetic task questions than did males in the previous session. Our incentivized belief 
question after the experiment provides evidence that subjects believed this to be true. Subjects in 




Figure 4 illustrates the average effort level (panel A) and wage (panel B) in each period 
for both treatments. The red dashed line illustrates the patterns under no quota and the blue solid 
line the patterns under quota. In panel A, average effort levels are clearly lower if there is a quota 
and the difference between treatments is large in all periods. In panel B, average wages are 
clearly lower if there is a quota and the difference between treatments is large in all periods.  
Figure 4: Effort and wages in the skill-gap experiment 
 
Notes: Blue solid (red dashed) lines illustrate behavior under quota (no quota). Data are from the laboratory 
skill-gap experiment.  
 
The treatment differences in wage and effort levels are substantial and statistically 
different. Managers offered a wage of 90.75 across all periods under no quota but only 78.47 
under quota, which is a significant wage reduction of 13.5% (p=0.008, n=86; Mann–Whitney 
two-tailed test).22 Similarly, we found that workers have higher effort levels under no quota 
(0.625) than under quota (0.50), a difference of approximately 25% (p=0.012, n=86).  
These differences are highly significant in a generalized least square (GLS) random-
effects models reported in Table 4, which control in particular for gender (1 if the subject is 
male, 0 otherwise), belief on partners’ performance (worker’s belief about the average 
performance of the opposite sex in the arithmetic task), belief on own performance (belief about 
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one’s own arithmetic score), a period trend and an indicator if the subject studies psychology.23 
We use these controls in all the following models. Standard errors were clustered at the group 
level. In the models, we found that workers in the quota treatment exerted 13.2-percentage points 
less effort than did their counterparts in the no-quota treatment (Table 4a, column 1, p<0.001). 
Furthermore, we found that wages are 13.4 points lower under quota (Table 4b, column 1, 
p<0.001). These findings are independent of the gender constellations (male manager–female 
worker, female manager–male worker) as we find that male and female managers offer lower 
wages under quota (11.9 and 13.4 points, respectively) and similarly, male and female workers 
provide lower effort (17.6% and 9.7%, respectively) (Tables 4a and b, columns 2 and 3).  
{INSERT TABLES 4a & 4b ABOUT HERE} 
In the preceding analysis, we focused on the impact of quotas on the functioning of 
hierarchical relationships and the interplay of managers and workers. However, it is also possible 
to provide an estimate of the impact of quotas on worker performance per se, that is, independent 
of wage. To do this, we controlled for the manager’s wage offering in our regressions. We 
estimated a GLS random-effects model with effort as the dependent variable and quota as the 
key variable of interest. The results are reported in Table 4a, column 4. We found that after the 
inclusion of our standard set of controls and the wage offered by the manager, quotas marginally 
reduce worker performance relative to no quota by 4.6 percentage points (p=0.075), and that the 
impact is stronger for males than females (6.3 pp. vs. 2.4 pp., ns). When the dependent variable 
was the wage offered by the manager and it was regressed on effort received in the last period 
(Table 4b, column 4), we found that wages are 7.3 points lower under quota (p<0.001). These 
findings are consistent with our meritocracy hypothesis and lead to our first main result. 
Result 1: Female manager quotas cause lower effort and wages in an environment in which 
women are on average less suited to become managers and are not disadvantaged. 
 
4.3. No Difference: The Impact of Quotas without Discrimination and Gender Performance 
Differences 
                                                        
23 Results are robust to estimating a model where we interact gender with treatment and to the inclusion of an 
indicator if the subject studies economics. 
23 
 
 In the no-difference experiment, subjects were informed that there is no average gender 
performance difference in the arithmetic task. Our incentivized belief question provides 
suggestive evidence that subjects’ actual beliefs about performance correspond to the 
information given. Subjects in this experiment believe that males are on average only 3.6% better 
than females in the arithmetic task, a significantly lower difference than in the skill-gap 
experiment (p<0.001). 
Figure 5 illustrates the average effort level (panel A) and wage (panel B) in each period 
for both treatments. In panel A, average effort levels are generally lower if there is a quota and 
the difference between treatments remains substantial over the course of the experiment. In panel 
B, average wages are generally lower if there is a quota and the difference between treatments 
appears to increase over periods.  
Figure 5: Effort and wages in the no-difference experiment 
 
Notes: Blue solid (red dashed) lines illustrate behavior under quota (no quota). Data are from the 
laboratory no-difference experiment.  
 
 The differences between treatments over time are significant. Managers offered a wage of 
89.97 across all periods when there is no quota but only 79.81 when there is a quota, a significant 
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absence of a gender quota (0.59, n=76) than when there is a gender quota (0.50), a difference of 
almost 20% (p=0.045). These differences are robust in our random-effects models with controls. 
In column 1 of Table 5a, quota is significantly negative (p=0.009), showing that effort levels are 
12 percentage points lower under quota. Similarly, introducing a quota reduces wages by 9.6 
points (p=0.026) if we use wages as the dependent variable (Table 5b, column 1). These findings 
are independent of the gender constellations, as both male–female and female–male manager–
worker pairs are responsible for the overall results (see columns 2 and 3 of Tables 5a and 5b).  
{INSERT TABLES 5a & 5b ABOUT HERE} 
In Table 5a, column 4, we include the wage offered by the manager, quota significantly 
reduces worker performance relative to no quota by 5.0 percentage points (p=0.030). The results 
are similar when we replace effort with wage, with managers offering 5 points less for a given 
effort level (p=0.014, Table 5b, column 4). Thus, consistent with our meritocracy predictions, 
our second result is as follows. 
Result 2: Female manager quotas cause lower effort and wages in an environment in which 
women are equally suited to become managers and they are not disadvantaged. 
 
4.4. Disadvantage: The impact of Quotas when Women are Disadvantaged 
  Figure 6 illustrates average effort levels (panel A) and average wages (panel B) in each 
period for both disadvantage treatments. In stark contrast to the skill-gap and no-difference 
environments, we observe that average wages are higher under quota and this holds on average 
across all periods (panel A). Moreover, we observe that average effort levels are always higher 
under quota than under no quota (panel A). 




Notes: Blue solid (red dashed) lines illustrate behavior under quota (no quota). Data are from the 
laboratory disadvantage experiment.  
 
{INSERT TABLES 6a & 6b ABOUT HERE} 
Managers offer an average wage of 79.58 across all periods under no quota but 88.14 
under quota, a significant wage increase of more than 10% (p=0.033, n=96). Similarly, workers 
have higher effort levels under quota (0.589) than under no quota (0.523), a difference that is 
large in magnitude but not significant (p=0.213, n=96). These differences are more pronounced 
in random-effects models (Tables 6). Workers in the quota treatment exert 6.5% more effort than 
their counterparts do in the no-quota treatment, a difference that is significant at p=0.058 (Table 
6a, column 1). Furthermore, wages are 9.5 points higher under quota (Table 6b, column 1, 
p=0.006). Controlling for wages, quota increases effort by 1.4 percentage points, but this change 
is insignificant (p=0.384, Table 6a, column 4). On the other hand, manager’s wage increases by 
6.5 points (p=0.001) under quota for a given lagged effort level (Table 6b, column 4). These 
results are largely consistent with the meritocracy hypothesis. 
Result 3a: Female manager quotas cause on average higher effort and wages in an environment 
in which women are disadvantaged and equally suited to become managers. 
Interestingly, this finding is not independent of the gender constellations. Figure 7 
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female manager–male worker) and the presence of a gender quota. Comparing panels A to C, 
effort levels in the quota environment only seem to be significantly higher in panel C (female 
workers) but not in panel A (male workers). Similarly, wages only seem to be higher in panel D 
(male managers) but not in panel B (female managers). To examine the robustness of these 
finding we estimate our random-effects models separately for males and females. Male workers’ 
effort (managers wage) is reported in Table 6a (6b), column 2 and 5 while female workers effort 
(managers wage) is shown in columns 3 and 6. Results corroborate these patterns and show that 
the average findings on higher effort and wages in the quota environment of the disadvantage 
experiment are entirely driven by the male manager–female worker pairs. The female manager–
male worker pairs do not behave differently in the presence and absence of the quota (p=0.442 
(female manager, see column 2 in Table 6a) and 0.445 (male worker, see column 3 in Table 6b) 
whereas the male manager–female worker pairs clearly change (p<.01, see column 3 in Table 6a 
and column 2 in Table 6b). 
Figure 7: Behavior in the disadvantage experiment by gender 
 
Notes: Panel A illustrates male workers’ effort under quota and no quota while panel B illustrates female managers 
under quota and no quota. Panel C illustrates female workers’ effort under quota and no quota while panel D 
illustrates male managers under quota and no quota. Data are from the laboratory disadvantage experiment. 
 
Result 3b: Female manager quotas do not cause higher effort and wages for male workers in an 
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Hierarchical relationships are key features of many organizations and determine 
organizational performance. There are many dangers to the functioning of hierarchical 
relationships. In particular, there is manifold evidence that fairness plays an important role when 
superiors interact with subordinates and conventional wisdom suggests that subordinates are less 
motivated if they question the selection mechanism of superiors. This is particularly important 
when acting to reduce persistent gender imbalances in managerial positions. For instance, female 
gender quotas, a common mechanism to counter gender imbalances might cause animosity if 
subordinates believe it promotes undeserving superiors.  
This study navigated this challenging context to investigate the impact of gender quotas 
on the functioning of hierarchical relationships in different workplace environments. We 
identified significant reactions to gender quotas, which are crucially determined by the 
workplace environment. If the workplace disadvantages women, female quotas improve 
hierarchical relationships; however, if there is no such disadvantage, female quotas harm 
hierarchical relationships. These findings are particularly important, as there are likely varying 
degrees of uncertainty and opinions about gender disadvantages outside the laboratory and as we 
found in our representative survey that the perception of gender disadvantages differs across 
occupations. Thus, we believe that it is beneficial to study and evaluate the perception of the 
labor market environment and whether workers believe that gender quotas undermine the 
principle of meritocracy in the workplace before considering their implementation.24 
Implementing quotas in workplaces in which employees do not perceive gender disadvantages 
could backfire and harm the organization, also hurting those who are meant to benefit from the 
quota. For example, our evidence suggests that quotas may harm hierarchical relationships in 
teaching, admin and office as employees in these occupations do not perceive significant gender 
disadvantages. 
Our study constitutes a novel attempt to study the links between gender quotas, 
hierarchical relationships, and workplace environments. We believe there is merit in 
complementing our findings with field data on the dynamics of hierarchical relationships before 
                                                        
24 Relatedly, Appendix Table A3 provides suggestive evidence that opinions towards gender quotas depend on the 
profession. For example, individuals who do not believe that there is a skill gap within their profession are more 
likely to hold negative opinions about quotas implemented in an environment where skill gap exists.  
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and after the introduction of gender quotas. Relatedly, it seems worthwhile to study experimental 
settings in which the dynamics of hierarchical relationships can be clearly attributed to managers 
and workers. For example, it would be interesting to know whether male managers or female 
workers drive the highly efficient interactions in the disadvantage experiment with a quota.
Furthermore, we believe that it is worthwhile to investigate the drivers behind perceptions of 
gender disadvantages, how they are determined by the workplace environment, and the extent to 
which the introduction of gender quotas affects perceptions. In particular, it seems important to 
verify whether employees perceive less gender disadvantages after the introduction of a gender 
quota and to relate this to the functioning of hierarchical relationships. Finally, it seems 
interesting to study whether reactions to gender quotas are more positive if it is communicated 
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Panel A: US sample 
Overall 2.87 3.58 3.31 2.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1011 
Male 2.97 3.50 3.36 2.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 504 
Female 2.77 3.66 3.26 1.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 507 
p-value (male 
vs female) 
0.016 0.136 0.209 0.00        
Panel B: Australian student sample 
Overall 2.77 3.58 3.25 1.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 171 
Male 3.00 3.63 3.43 2.07 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 87 
Female 2.54 3.53 3.07 1.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 84 
p-value (male 
vs female) 
0.007 0.513 0.073 0.002        
p-value (AUS 
vs US) overall 
sample  
0.435 0.744 0.503 0.005        
p-value (AUS 
vs US) male 
sample 
0.885 0.549 0.786 0.237        
p-value (AUS 
vs US) female 
sample 
0.137 0.276 0.208 0.003        
Notes: This table shows the average response to the field survey questions. Male and Female rows restrict the 
sample by gender. Survey responses range from 1= strongly agree to 5= strongly disagree. Columns 5 to 10 report 
the p-values of differences using a Wilcoxon sign rank test. For instance column 5 reports the p-value for the 
difference between column 1 and column 2 responses. p-values from panel B are taken from Wilcoxon rank sum 
tests. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table 2: Effort level and costs 
Effort 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 





Table 3: Predictions for the impact of the gender quota on gift exchange levels 
 














 Skill gap  →  ↓   ↑   ↓  
No difference  →  ↓   ↑   ↓  
Disadvantage  →  ↑  ↑  ↓ 
Notes: The arrows indicate the change in both wage and effort levels (constant, decrease, or increase) from treatment 
no quota to quota in each experiment. The predictions do not depend on the gender of the manager for standard 
reciprocity and meritocracy. 
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Table 4a: Predicting effort in the skill-gap experiment   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












 effort effort effort effort effort effort 
              
Quota  –0.132*** –0.176*** –0.097* –0.046* –0.063* –0.024 
 (0.038) (0.044) (0.054) (0.026) (0.035) (0.039) 
Male worker 0.013   0.048   
 (0.048)   (0.030)   
Wage    0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Constant 0.609*** 0.709*** 0.513*** 0.020 0.170 –0.044 
 (0.065) (0.092) (0.092) (0.075) (0.125) (0.058) 
       
Observations 1,290 660 630 1,290 660 630 
Number of subjects 86 44 42 86 44 42 
Table 4b: Predicting wage in the skill-gap experiment 














 wage wage wage wage wage wage 
       
Quota –13.372*** –11.864*** –13.446*** –7.308*** –5.765** –8.347*** 
 (2.892) (4.505) (3.721) (1.844) (2.881) (2.631) 
Male 1.304   3.644   
 (5.161)   (3.334)   
Effort (t-1)    53.313*** 62.982*** 44.341*** 
    (3.894) (3.190) (6.015) 
       
Constant 82.221*** 66.503*** 86.037*** 50.998*** 38.378*** 59.737*** 
 (8.129) (14.079) (9.332) (5.685) (9.745) (6.044) 
       
Observations 1,290 630 660 1,204 588 616 
Number of subjects 86 42 44 86 42 44 
Notes: Random-effects models. All regressions include controls. Controls include gender of the worker, if they 
study psychology, average belief about partners’ gender arithmetic score, and belief about own arithmetic score. 
Period control accounts for time trends in this model. In both components of Table 4, columns 2 (3) and 5 (6) restrict 
the sample to male (female) subjects. Data are from the laboratory skill-gap experiment. Significance levels are *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5a: Predicting effort in the no-difference experiment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












 effort effort effort effort effort effort 
              
Quota –0.120*** –0.135** –0.117* –0.050** –0.065** –0.047 
 (0.046) (0.062) (0.068) (0.023) (0.030) (0.039) 
Male 0.057*   0.048**   
 (0.030)   (0.023)   
Wage    0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Constant 0.419*** 0.447*** 0.448*** -0.006 –0.003 0.009 
 (0.111) (0.155) (0.112) (0.053) (0.097) (0.053) 
       
Observations 1,140 600 540 1,140 600 540 
Number of subjects 76 40 36 76 40 36 
Table 5b: Predicting wage in the no-difference experiment  














 wage wage wage wage wage wage 
       
Quota –9.625** –11.075** –8.090* –5.039** –7.219*** –3.010 
 (4.321) (5.139) (4.629) (2.061) (2.156) (3.151) 
Male 1.002   1.825   
 (2.601)   (1.951)   
Lag Effort    55.854*** 58.906*** 53.522*** 
    (6.476) (9.848) (5.062) 
       
Constant 79.861*** 87.287*** 70.324*** 49.611*** 56.004*** 41.854*** 
 (10.594) (12.520) (9.444) (6.586) (8.677) (6.315) 
       
Observations 1,140 540 600 1,064 504 560 
Number of subject 76 36 40 76 36 40 
Notes: Random-effects models. All regressions include controls. Controls include gender of the worker, if they 
study psychology, average belief about partners’ gender arithmetic score, and belief about own arithmetic score. 
Period control accounts for time trends in this model. In both components of Table 5, columns 2 (3) and 5 (6) restrict 
the sample to male (female) subjects. Data are from the laboratory no-difference experiment. Significance levels are 





Table 6a: Predicting effort in the disadvantage experiment 













 effort effort effort effort effort effort 
              
Quota 0.065* –0.046 0.141*** 0.014 –0.076** 0.075*** 
 (0.034) (0.060) (0.051) (0.016) (0.030) (0.027) 
Male 0.010   0.041   
 (0.047)   (0.029)   
Wage    0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Constant 0.549*** 0.547*** 0.545*** 0.050 0.012 0.105 
 (0.103) (0.130) (0.100) (0.067) (0.097) (0.073) 
       
Observations 1,440 675 765 1,440 675 765 
Number of subjects 96 45 51 96 45 51 
 
Table 6b: Predicting wage in the disadvantage experiment 














 wage wage wage wage wage wage 
       
Quota 9.550*** 15.134*** 4.002 6.553*** 8.032** 5.031 
 (3.451) (5.732) (5.240) (1.988) (3.661) (3.063) 
Male 7.184   8.303**   
 (6.127)   (4.061)   
Lag effort    53.075*** 54.016*** 53.627*** 
    (4.103) (6.518) (3.462) 
       
Constant 66.942*** 64.688*** 78.259*** 43.349*** 45.298*** 48.842*** 
 (8.951) (11.122) (9.401) (6.497) (7.967) (8.844) 
       
Observations 1,440 765 675 1,344 714 630 
Number of subjects 96 51 45 96 51 45 
Notes: Random-effects models. All regressions include controls. Controls include gender of the worker, if they 
study psychology, average belief about partners’ gender arithmetic score, and belief about own arithmetic score. 
Period control accounts for time trends in this model. In both parts of Table 6, columns 2 (3) and 5 (6) restrict the 
sample to male (female) subjects. Data are from the laboratory disadvantage experiment. Significance levels are *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 
